

Department of the Navy



The Role of the Military: Doing What with What?

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Part I: Understanding where we are


I take ...a 'GPS approach' to strategy.... The first thing you have to understand about the historical moment is where we are."

Ralph Peters, 2007



Everyone is focused on understanding the implications of the fourth post-World War II drawdown

(Dollars in Billions)



Total Defense BA in Constant FY 2011 Dollars

Projections (red bars) assume OMB guidance plus OCO placeholder of \$70B in FY14, trending to \$20B in FY17




However, it would be a big mistake to think of this as a simple budget drill

- As President Obama said:
 - “[We have] failed to appreciate *the connection between our national security and our economy*. Our prosperity provides a foundation to our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy.”
 - “...I’d encourage all of us to remember what President Eisenhower once said — that “each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.” *After a decade of war, and as we rebuild the source of our strength — at home and abroad — it’s time to restore that balance.*”



As we seek a different, more sustainable path for continued US global leadership, we find ourselves at a strategic inflection point

(Dollars in Billions)



Total Defense BA in Constant FY 2011 Dollars

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The President is not saying military power will be any less important...just that its role will change in National Grand Strategy

*“The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way, our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced. **But when we overuse our military might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools, or act without partners, then our military is overstretched, Americans bear a greater burden, and our leadership around the world is too narrowly identified with military force.**”*



Part II: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

*“This country is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war and, therefore, we are **shaping a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced.** It will have cutting edge capabilities, exploiting our technological, joint, and networked advantage...It will remain the world’s finest military.*

President Barack Obama, 2012



The new strategic guidance:

- Requires we maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent—if possible with a smaller nuclear force.
- Places great emphasis on sustaining freedom of access throughout the global commons, tying these efforts directly to the health of the global system of commerce and America's continued economic growth.
- Prioritizes sustaining U.S. global freedom of action even in the face of increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area-denial threats.
- Emphasizes non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability to reduce the demand for significant troop commitments to nation-building or stability operations.
- Rebalances the focus of U.S. military forces toward the Asia-Pacific region 7



The new strategic guidance (continued):

- Calls for a long-term strategic partnership with India, to support its role as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the Indian Ocean.
- Continues to maintain U.S. and allied military presence in—and support of—partner nations in and around the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but with less emphasis on large numbers of boots on the ground.
- Reduces our land-based posture in Europe while increasing forward-stationed naval forces.
- Calls for innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives in Africa and Latin America.



Part III: Implications for the DoN

“To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons—those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissues of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air and sea.”

Sustaining US Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense



Building a "National Fleet"


- Navy Battle Force
- US Coast Guard
- US Marine Corps
- Special Mission Fleet
- Prepo Fleet/Surge Sealift
- Ready Reserve Force
- Maritime Patrol and Recon Force
- Naval aviation
- Navy-Marine SOF/Cyber
- Industrial base partners





Navy-Marine Corps Team is transforming itself into a “Total Force Battle Network”

- 300-ship Battle Force with a hi-lo mix:
 - Focus on flexible payload space
 - Open combat systems
- 182,100-strong Marine Corps
 - Expeditionary MAGTF
 - Focus on distributed operations
- Improved battle networking
 - NIFC-CA
- Increased emphasis on unmanned systems
- Focus on network v. network warfare
 - AirSea Battle
 - Forcible entry and seabasing
 - AirLand Battle with G-RAMM
- Distributed and disaggregated operations





TFBN Battle Force emphasizes versatile platforms with flexible payload and open combat systems



Small

Medium

Large

X- Large

XX- Large

Designed for a “strategy of the second move”



DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS



Some might say that although the absolute level of defense spending is at an all time high, the burden on the economy is manageable

- After all, \$700+ billion is slightly less than 5% of the nation's GDP, far below that of the Cold War average
- This argument is not very compelling
 - A first sin of strategy: not understanding that *all resources are scarce, and must be prioritized*
 - During the debate for the FY1954 budget:
 - Deficits were projected to reach \$56 billion (!) by 1957
 - Great pressure to reduce war taxes (!)
 - Permanent statutory programs — debt service, veteran's benefits, price supports, grants in aids to states, and social security — consumed 18% (!) of federal expenditures
 - Non-defense discretionary programs consumed another 12% of the budget
 - Even though defense spending amounted to 70% of federal spending, representing over 10% of GDP, still required hard prioritization, which led to the "New Look"



Also hard to argue that today's defense threats are much worse than in the past

- In early 1953, during the debates over the FY54 budget:
 - (We are at war!) In early 1953, we were engaged in a major conventional war against Communist China; the use of tactical nuclear weapons was being actively considered
 - (What about a nuclear-armed Korea?) Soviets exploded their first hydrogen bomb in August 1954
 - (What about Iran?) Through 1953, we were dealing with a major crisis in Iran, which ultimately led to a UK and US orchestrated overthrow of the democratically elected government
 - (What about radical extremism and al Qaeda?) In 1953 we were dealing with local proxy aggression and fomented insurrection in underdeveloped Third World countries in Southeast Asia, Greece, Guatemala, the Philippines
 - (What about new cyber threats to the homeland?) In 1953, the threat of direct atomic attack on US homeland was growing
 - Soviets build 847 TU-4 bombers (reverse engineered copies of US B-29s) from 1947 through 1952
 - (What about a rising China?) Chinese communists ejected Nationalists from mainland in 1949; continued cross-strait tensions
 - (What about homeland security?) Aerospace and civil defense requirements were high
 - (What about partnership building?) We were rebuilding NATO and Japan



The National Fleet

Battle Force (TFBN)

Small Craft

TFBN includes 300+ ships (TBD FSA)

22 Riverine Patrol Boats (39')

16 Riverine Assault Boats (33')

7 Riverine Command Boats (49')

118 Patrol Boats (34')

48 Patrol Boats (25')

Marine Corps

3 Marine Expeditionary Forces

Coast Guard

8 National Security Cutters (418')

25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (TBD)

58 Fast Response Cutters (154')

Small Craft

75 Coastal Patrol Boats (87')

180 Response Boats, Medium (45')

475 Response Boats, Small (25')

Special Mission Ships

18 ships



The National Fleet (II)

Prepo Force	31 ships
Surge Sealift	15 ships
RRF	46 ships
MPRF	84 P-8As Multi-mission Manned Aircraft 20 MQ-4C BAMS
TACAIR	36/1 USN squadrons (10 CVWs) 18/3 USMC squadrons
AEW&BM	10 E2D squadrons 14 EA-18G squadrons
Rotary Wing	19/2 HSC squadrons 14/1 HSM squadrons 2 active/reserve HM squadrons 16/2 VMM squadrons 8/1 HMMH squadrons 8/1 HMLA squadrons 3/2 VMU squadrons



People who focus just on battle force numbers are missing the forest for the trees

- **Old think: Total Ship Battle Force:**

- Focus on the number of ships in the US Navy battle force
- **Build a battle force inventory that gives numerical or a warfighting advantage based on number of ships or their combat capability, e.g.:**
 - Two-navy standard
 - Number of guns
 - Number of missiles
- **Define the aggregate fleet combat capability in a single number, e.g., the “600-ship Navy”**

- **New Think: Total Force Battle Network:**

- Focus on the aggregate combat capability of all manned and unmanned platforms, sensors, and combat systems in the National Fleet, linked together as a cohesive force
 - Total Ship Battle Force is just one component—albeit and important one—of the TFBN
- **Build a battle network that gives a decided advantage in:**
 - Scouting and anti-scouting (sensors)
 - C3I and counter C3I (speed of command)
 - Force and counter-force
- **Different standards to define capability, e.g.,**
 - Protected bandwidth (Tb)
 - Displacement standard (full load displacement is best proxy for ship—and fleet—capabilities)